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- Journal of the Theoretical Humanities
Mind becomes nature and acquires a tendency. It is determined; subjectivity is an effect, an impression of reflection. The mind, having been affected by the principles, becomes a subject again, note the rules of operation…. But psych of human nature is one of dispositions — morality, politics, history. It is a transcendence or going beyond. I affirm more than I know; my judgment goes beyond the idea…I speak in general terms and I have beliefs, I establish relations — this is a fact and a practice. The transcendence here is not given, but is a qualification of the mind.
Transcendence is typically? Example: if necessity is an impression of reflection a qualification of the mind , there must also be an idea of necessity, but it cannot produce the idea as a quality of things? But rationalism has lost this philosophy. H critiques representations, not relations. So reason is instinct, habit or nature.
Read PDF The Empiricism of Subjectivity: Deleuze and Consciousness
So reason is a kind of feeling; it goes from skepticism to a kind of positivism, from a skepticism of reason to a positivism of feeling with reason being a reflection of feeling. Impressions of sensation — origin of the mind. A simple origin which frees ideas from obligation of representing things. Impressions of reflection — qualification of the mind and effect of principles in it.
We are not interested in the origin of the mind but the constitution of the subject. The self is a synthesis of ideas and disposition, of mind and subject. It ties them together without reconciliation sublation H: distinct perceptions are distinct existences but the mind never perceived a real connection between them.
Effects of association determine the system of understanding ; belief. Fixes generality. Effects of passion determine the system of passion and ethics ; sympathy. Content of constancy, practical and moral activity, meaning of history. In H, all theories are theories of practice understanding has probabilities and general rules; in morality there are general rules and justice. Orlando: Harcourt Books. Deleuze, Gilles; Hurley, Robert Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Hurley, Robert; Deleuze, Gilles The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CS1 maint: extra text: authors list link Schrift, Alan D. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. CS1 maint: extra text: authors list link. Hidden categories: Articles containing French-language text CS1 maint: extra text: authors list. Namespaces Article Talk. Rather than simply a phenomenal echo of the transcendental unity of apperception, Lumsden takes the 'I think' to actually accompany all of our representations 34 , taking it for the synthetic subject itself.
The nuances of Kant's project play an important role both in broadening out the definition of what it is to be post-Kantian, but also in the development of alternatives to Hegel's thought. Lumsden's reading of Kant sees him as essentially failing in a classical metaphysical project of relating categories to objects, rather than succeeding in redefining the nature of objectivity in terms of law-governed experience.
Somewhat ironically, this metaphysical reading of Kant makes Lumsden's 'post-Kantian' Hegel look decidedly precritical at points.
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Traditionally, contradiction has been a major part of the interpretation of Hegelian dialectics. If Kant is right that reason operating autonomously leads to contradiction, then Hegel can be said to bite the bullet, and to include contradiction as a real feature of the world. He writes in the Science of Logic , for instance, that the world is 'never and nowhere without contradiction. The Phenomenology transitions between different accounts of consciousness and the object not because of the internal contradictions within a given shape of consciousness here.
Rather, what drives reason to reject a given shape of consciousness is its sense that there is a 'background whole. Reason operates by making explicit these background assumptions, thus incorporating them into the conceptual scheme of consciousness itself. Lumsden sees this process as relying on a concept-intuition model, where background assumptions that are implicit and non-discursive the intuitions are gradually made explicit and brought into the domain of discursivity by reason.
This process is ongoing, and leads to a dynamic, unstable model of consciousness unlike the account of Hegel's self which Lumsden attributes to the post-structuralists.
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There are a number of issues with this account that are worth raising. Viewing the process of the Phenomenology itself as making intuition discursive leads to a number of potential problems, some textual, and some logical. First, the process of incorporation of intuitions into self-consciousness doesn't seem to capture the radical break we find with the categorial transitions of the Phenomenology. Lumsden presumably has to play down Hegel's claim that consciousness is not so much destabilised as destroyed by its dialectical transitions. Similarly, for Hegel, consciousness suffers despair as it moves through the Phenomenology and discovers its worldviews to be self-contradictory, rather than appearing prior to this as reason's intimation of the limits of its present view.
For Lumsden, 'Thought is unsettled precisely because it is oriented by more than what it can, at any given point in time, explicitly affirm to be a determination of itself. Second, in making what drives reason its recognition of a broader view of the world than what is represented in its present categories, Lumsden appears to present a different origin to our categories of thought than Hegel does.
Traditionally, Hegel's account of categories is read as seeing new ways of viewing the world as emerging immanently from the failure of our present beliefs. While these categories may imply that our understanding of the world must be mediated by the broader community, the categories themselves are not a product of that community, but of the contradictions of a prior form of consciousness. By beginning with the simple structure of sense-certainty the simple truth that there is something before consciousness, with no attempt to qualify this thatness , Hegel attempts to demonstrate that reason is led necessarily to a belief in the adequacy of discursive thought to being.
For Lumsden, on the contrary, our categories of thought are 'intersubjectively derived', and form the 'collective human determination' of the community, rather than emerging immanently from the dialectic.
Presumably Hegel would want to say that regardless of the actual assumptions of a community, the process of dialectical transition of the Phenomenology holds. Lumsden's communitarian account runs the risk of making Hegel's project simply an attempt to explicate the structure of modern society. As he puts it at one point, 'the dialectic is an attempt to give philosophy a philosophical form that is adequate to the dynamism of modern life.
This does not fix reality in any weighty metaphysical sense but simply tries to give an adequate philosophical expression of modern life. Lumsden renders it a process of discovery, and translation of the implicit into the explicit, rather than a creative enterprise. It also becomes a project guided by a telos that precedes it in the form of the structure of society already implicitly accepted by the subject. Both of these results form the basis for much of the post-structuralism opposition to Hegelian dialectics, which is often taken to be conservative, rather than creative, and one wonders whether this account of the self-validation of community norms might be vulnerable to the kinds of hermeneutics of suspicion found in Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.
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Finally, in making the process of incorporating implicit assumptions into reason the basis of Hegel's project, Lumsden's account makes Hegel's project one that extends indefinitely, as the discursive expands to incorporate the infinite content of intuition. Such a process resembles Hegel's spurious infinite rather than the good infinite that Hegel takes to provide an adequate account of the world.
While there may be solutions to all of these problems, Lumsden does little to defend his reading against these potential criticisms, which serves to weaken his conclusions. Lumsden's characterisation of the relationship between concepts and intuitions feels closer to a form of Leibnizianism, where intuitive structures are the result of confused perceptions of what an infinite being would regard as conceptual truths, rather than Kant's difference in kind. Ironically, this kind of Leibnizian model was the reason for Kant's adoption of a model of intuition as different in kind from conceptual determinations, following the perceived failure of Leibniz to successfully defend his position in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence.
Here, perhaps, returning to Kant, we find the key difference between Hegel and the post-structuralists.go here
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Whereas Kant and the post-structuralists consider intuition and related concepts to be essentially non-discursive, Hegel and Lumsden consider them to be only accidentally non-discursive, but not inherently incommensurate with reason. In the critical portion of his study, Lumsden argues that both Derrida and Deleuze derive their critiques of Hegel from Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of presence.
In the first chapter he briefly develops this account, focusing on Heidegger's criticism of Descartes' attempt to develop a purely epistemic account of our relation to the world. This short opening account of Heidegger's criticism of Hegel is supplemented in chapter 4 by an extended treatment of Heidegger. In keeping with Lumsden's focus on the notion of self-consciousness, his account of Heidegger focuses on the structures of das Man , and of care.
His analysis of Heidegger is relatively standard, tracing Dasein's inauthentic understanding while caught in das Man through anxiety to an authentic understanding of itself as care.